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MISSION COMMAND IN A FUTURE NAVAL 
COMBAT ENVIRONMENT
 Mission command is a command-and-control (C2) concept that increasingly is being integrated into the doctrine of the U�S� armed forces� Joint Publi-
cation 3-0 defines it as follows: “If a commander loses reliable communications, 
mission command—a key component of the C2 [joint] function—enables military 
operations through decentralized execution based on mission-type orders” (em-
phasis original)�1 Throughout its history, the Navy has practiced decentralized C2 
owing to the huge distances involved and the dif-
ficulty of communications� However, the modern 
networked and more intensely joint/multidomain 
environment imposes a new context within which 
C2 in a war-at-sea environment will be practiced� 
To adapt its tradition of decentralized C2 to a new 
environment that features the potential for high-
end war at sea, naval officers must understand 
how the dynamics of naval combat affect the tran-
sition from a communications-rich environment 
to one that is either constrained or distorted— 
specifically, the considerations required to exert 
effective mission command as operations devolve 
into forms characterized by lesser degrees of struc-
ture and control�
The Navy is currently in the process of re-
discovering its war-at-sea roots, owing to the 
emergence of potential opposition to its policy of 
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maintaining a free and open global commons, with such opposition supported 
by the naval building programs of both China and Russia� One of the key con-
cepts on which that rediscovery is riding is distributed lethality, the installation 
of offensive missiles on a wide variety of the Navy’s ships� The idea is to increase 
the number of potential shooters with which an enemy navy has to deal, instead 
of allowing it to focus narrowly on our aircraft carriers� The concept also im-
plies greater geographic dispersion of forces, including surface action groups 
(SAGs) and independently operating ships that are not attached to the carrier 
battle group� Such distribution and dispersal pose C2 challenges for the Navy; 
the intended solution is a wide-area battle-force network� However, opponents 
will challenge that network, and dispersed units may find themselves with either 
partial or no connectivity� A current answer to this problem is the concept of 
mission command�
Recognition that a return to war fighting at sea is necessary has been slow to 
come and incremental, with the discussion over the past few years focused on 
countering littoral antiaccess/area-denial systems� The development of air-sea 
battle, now transformed into the joint concept for access and maneuver in the 
global commons (known as JAM-GC), is a step forward in addressing the prob-
lem, but does not cover all the bases with regard to a fleet-versus-fleet engagement� 
While the author acknowledges that a future sea battle will be multidimensional 
and multidomain, there are certain dynamics of fleet-versus-fleet combat, which 
will be discussed in this article, that commanders at all levels must understand�
War at sea always has been difficult to control, even with the advent of radio, 
radar, and computing� The historical trend is that advances in communications 
have been matched by increases in weapons ranges and distance between friendly 
units� The constant has been the difficulty an admiral has in maintaining control 
of the flow of a fight� This is one reason that Navy culture is characterized by 
decentralization and the philosophy of command by negation� Naval officers at 
all levels are inculcated with the ethos of thinking for themselves� This culture 
has served the Navy well throughout its history and may yet do so again, but an 
understanding of its place in the arena of modern naval combat is necessary for 
its intelligent application� To develop such understanding, it is useful to revisit 
the dynamics of combat at sea�
NAVAL COMBAT DYNAMICS: THREE TRADITIONAL MODES
Tactical combat at sea generally has occurred in three basic modes: structured 
battle, melee, and sniping�2 These modes emerge from the relationship between 
a commander and his or her forces, and thus are manifested whether we are 
talking about oared galleys, nuclear submarines, or unmanned vehicles� It is also 
a comprehensively exhaustive list; any manner of fighting at sea (as opposed to 
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projecting power ashore) will be a variation of one of these modes� Understand-
ing this is an important first step in gaining a useful grasp of naval war fighting, 
and thus the necessary approach to mission command in the new context� De-
fining the intellectual boundaries of a problem serves as a clarifying lens and a 
counterweight to vague and sometimes oracular new concepts and the immoder-
ate claims made for new technologies�
We will define structured battle as a broad term that indicates coordinated ac-
tion among the units of a force, whether individual ships, task groups, or even a 
fleet� In past eras, the battle line was the principal tool admirals used to achieve 
coherence and coordination among their individual ships� This worked when 
guns were the main armament� Once aviation developed to the point of being 
able to sink ships, the aircraft carrier–centric circular formation and aggrega-
tions of it became the basis for coordination and control� However, a specific 
formation is not a prerequisite for engaging in a structured battle� Tight doctrine, 
detailed plans, and ship captains who are well schooled in the commander’s in-
tent are also ways to achieve structure and coordination� Among the objectives 
of a structured-battle approach are making the force as a whole maneuverable, 
massing fires, and obtaining mutual support� The distinguishing characteristic 
is coordination, regardless of how it is attained, whether by doctrine; operation 
order; a more distributed command authority; or swift, compact, and almost 
invisible tactical commands, using a modern signal book�
A melee is a form of battle in which each unit fights on its own without coordi-
nation with others� A common mode of fighting in the days of galleys up through 
nineteenth-century battles in the age of sail, a melee was characterized by loss of 
control by the admiral after initial contact and usually involved confusion, if not 
chaos� Nonetheless, under certain conditions, the melee at sea could be advanta-
geous, if not downright desirable� In the days of sail, if an enemy’s line broke and 
he started to flee, a general chase resulting in a melee was considered “permis-
sible, indeed obligatory�”3 The idea was to take advantage of an enemy’s disarray 
and demoralization by engaging as many of his ships as possible so as to neutral-
ize his fleet� In World War II, a notorious incident occurred during the battle of 
Leyte Gulf� Japanese vice admiral Takeo Kurita failed to give general chase to 
fleeing American forces when he had the opportunity to inflict great damage�4
In one sense, then, a naval melee can be the functional equivalent of kicking 
the enemy when he is down—a desirable operational situation that calls for ag-
gressiveness, even at the cost of control� The downside to a melee is that units 
tend to lose mutual support, so risk increases; but the potential payoff is inflicting 
greater loss on the enemy than could be achieved if structure and control were 
maintained� The distinguishing characteristic of a melee—at least in the sense in 
which the term is used in this discussion—is the absence of coordination among 
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units� While the breakdown in coordination among the elements of a force could 
occur in a defensive struggle—especially if the force is surprised, as was the Allied 
force in the first battle of Savo Island (August 1942)—more often it has occurred 
when an overall aggressive thrust of the force is called for�5
A key characteristic of melee warfare is that, unless planned beforehand, it 
springs on a commander unexpectedly� Therefore, the commander’s mind must 
be ready to make a difficult decision in a heartbeat� It is a risk-versus-payoff deci-
sion that involves an understanding of the current relationship between strategy 
and operations� Admiral Kurita stood to lose ships if he pressed his attack, but 
the payoff could have been major disruption of the Allied campaign� It does not 
appear that Admiral Kurita was prepared to make that decision in any kind of 
considered way� Personal inclinations may be a powerful influence—one might 
imagine how differently Admiral William F� “Bull” Halsey would have acted had 
he been in Kurita’s shoes� A prepared mind is one that understands the character-
istics of a melee both as an unexpected danger and as an opportunity to exploit, 
and its potential place within the overall campaign structure� Such a mind would 
be ready to make the best decision for his or her force�6 A commander who seeks 
to issue enlightened mission orders ought to understand the potential situations 
that subordinate commanders might encounter and prepare them to mitigate, 
accept, or exploit a melee if the opportunity presents itself�
Sniping is ambush warfare� At sea it most often has taken the form of com-
merce raiding, but in World War II in the Pacific there were a number of cases 
in which submarines on both sides were able to pick off major combatants�7 Like 
the melee, sniping involves units acting independently; but, unlike the melee, it 
is highly dispersed and episodic� Given its dispersed nature, the risk to individual 
units is a function of their stealth—submarines being the most effective—because 
sniping is undertaken in areas in which the enemy is sufficiently strong to make 
structured battle a losing proposition� In sniping, wide latitude is granted to the 
individual ship captain to select targets and the time and place to attack them�
ADAPTATION TO THE MODERN ENVIRONMENT
Although structured battle has been the default mode of sea fights at least 
since the development of the line-ahead battle formation, the other two modes 
have been used in various conditions� The question for today’s naval tacticians 
and campaign planners is what the equivalent conditions are in the modern 
operational environment, and how each mode plays out in the age of missiles, 
unmanned systems, and battle networks� Especially interesting is how modern 
weapons affect the decision on whether to allow some kind of melee to occur 
or to try to maintain a structured fight even if it means, as it did with Admi-
ral Kurita, passing up opportunities to inflict great destruction on the enemy� 
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Obviously, the nature of the weapons being used exerts considerable influence� 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, writing in an era in which the ram as the principal naval 
weapon was starting to be challenged by the long-range naval rifle, speculated 
on the relationship between melee and structured battle (the prevailing view 
then being that ram-induced melees were the proper form of battle)� “Until that 
time [trial by battle] there is room for the opposite view—that a melee between 
numerically equal fleets, in which skill is reduced to a minimum, is not the best 
that can be done with the elaborate and mighty weapons of this age�”8
It should be noted that structured battle is the underlying assumption behind 
much of, if not all, the literature on network-centric warfare (NCW)� A key tenet 
of NCW is self-synchronization, a condition in which individual units would be 
able to achieve coordination of their efforts without the need for rigid plans or in-
tervention from centralized authority�9 While NCW assumes sufficient network 
connectivity to enable self-synchronization, a similar effect can be achieved by 
units adhering rigidly to prebattle doctrine, plans, or both� Similarly, “control-
free” operations, as the NCW literature visualizes them, do not imply a melee�10 
Current initiatives, such as network-optional warfare, are also ways of achieving 
coordination among forces without having network connectivity available con-
tinuously�11 The relative elasticity or intermittency of C2 measures does not have 
a bearing on whether a force is engaging in structured battle or melee, or sniping 
for that matter�
Nested Variation
The range of naval weapons, such as aircraft and missiles, and the dispersed 
nature of battles permit nesting of the fighting modes� A major operation involv-
ing subordinate task forces and groups is likely to be planned as a structured 
battle, but sniping operations could be built into it� Moreover, depending on the 
exigencies of battle, individual groups or units may end up operating in melee 
conditions�
At the October 1944 battle of Leyte Gulf, all three modes were on display� 
The day prior to the battle, American submarines Darter and Dace ambushed 
Admiral Kurita’s task force, sinking his flagship� Structured battle took place 
in the Surigao Strait when the battle line of Rear Admiral Jesse B� Oldendorf, 
USN, blasted two Japanese forces attempting a southern pincer maneuver� As 
mentioned earlier, a brief melee broke out between Admiral Kurita’s force, which 
issued through the San Bernardino Strait, and Rear Admiral Clifton A� Sprague’s 
escort carrier force, which it caught by surprise� Kurita at first ordered a general 
chase (an order that normally produces a melee), but then—possibly uncomfort-
able with the way his force was losing cohesion—he ordered his units to regroup, 
which let the American force gain some separation� Kurita subsequently ordered 
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a withdrawal� From the perspective of Admiral Chester W� Nimitz, commander 
of the Pacific Ocean Areas, the overall operation to support General Douglas 
MacArthur’s landing on Leyte might have appeared to degenerate into a melee, 
once he learned that Halsey had taken his entire force north chasing after Vice 
Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa, leaving the San Bernardino Strait uncovered� Any time 
a naval force is dispersed into individual units or independent groups, such as 
is called for in today’s emerging concept of distributed lethality, the nesting of 
modes could occur—planned, desired, or not�
The Effects of Reach: Weapons, Sensors, and Communications
In 1944, C2 of dispersed forces could be exerted only by precursor plans and 
orders or through radiotelegraphy� This necessarily left wide latitude for task-
force commanders and ship captains to operate as they saw fit� At the same time, 
weapons were targeted mostly visually, whether by aircrew, periscope, or ship’s 
lookouts� In today’s missile age, the situation has changed, with a number of dif-
ferent nonvisual sources of target location and identification available� These are 
integrated into a common operational picture (COP) that is shared among units 
and headquarters, and whose radius may extend a thousand miles or more� Rid-
ing on data links and secure, long-haul communications, the COP creates a whole 
new environment in which the three modes of sea fighting will occur�
Most readers of this article will be familiar with the campaign-phasing tem-
plate embedded in joint doctrine�12 Its phases range from Phase 0 (Shape) to 
Phase V (Enable Civil Authority)� The following discussion will focus on Phases 
II (Seize the Initiative) and III (Dominate)—in other words, once the fighting 
breaks out� However, later on it will examine the role of the three modes during 
Phase I (Deter), moving to crisis and the brink of war�
In a very real sense, the differentiation among the three fighting modes in a 
modern operational environment will be a function of network conditions� The 
battle-force network, and perhaps fragments thereof, is a prerequisite for effec-
tive missile combat, in that it facilitates over-the-horizon targeting (OTH-T) and 
the efficient use of missiles at the group and higher levels� Relayed positive target 
identification is necessary to comply with the law of armed conflict, and effi-
ciency is required because a force necessarily possesses fewer missiles than it does 
bullets for guns or bombs for aircraft�13 If missiles are expended inefficiently, a 
force may run out before the enemy is defeated, necessitating risky replenishment 
operations sooner or more often than otherwise necessary, or even retirement in 
the face of the enemy� Ways will be found to replenish missiles at sea; nonethe-
less, missiles are far less tolerant of inefficient use than other types of weapons� 
Efficiency may be defined from different frames of reference: ship, group, force, 
or theater� In all cases, a functioning network is key to their efficient use� This 
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suggests that structured battle is the best mode to employ, with tight firing coor-
dination among as many units as possible�
However, it is likely that a capable enemy will attempt to disrupt our battle-
force network in some way, through either intrusion or denial, or we may cut 
communications voluntarily by imposing emissions-control conditions to deny 
targeting information to the enemy� We can define four dimensions of network 
status: full or constrained (available bandwidth); constant or intermittent con-
nectivity; one- or two-way communications; and confidence level, in terms 
of the validity of the data coming through� Of course, the network also might 
be completely dark� While these conditions may characterize the network as a 
whole, they more likely will exist either at the unit level or across some fraction 
of the force� Owing to the wide dispersal of autonomous or semiautonomous 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, it could be the case 
that a distant maritime operations center (MOC) has better situational awareness 
about local conditions than a unit or group commander, assuming the opposing 
forces are over the horizon from each other� Of course, the opposite also could 
be the case�
In either situation, when communications are disrupted it must be left to the 
local commander to decide what to do� It is in this situation that an understand-
ing of the three modes of sea fighting will be needed to concoct robust com-
mander’s intent before the battle and to inform constructive decision making by 
unit and group commanders�
Planning and Doctrine
Assuming the force under discussion initially engaged under the construct of 
structured battle—regardless of how dispersed it may have become since then—
the logical course is to try to maintain some semblance of that structure even 
as the network suffers degradations� However, planning and doctrine should 
consider the prospects for doing so� If the initial plan requires little in the way 
of contingent C2 loops once in execution, then the plan, while inflexible, is rela-
tively impervious to network outages, and a form of structured battle is likely to 
ensue and continue�
However, inflexible plans usually are not desirable, so the next best thing is 
to have a plan, or perhaps a doctrine, that can accommodate initiative by unit 
commanders as they see local conditions develop� The classic paradigm for this 
is the battle of Trafalgar, at which Admiral Horatio Nelson’s captains had such a 
clear understanding of his ideas about tactics under a wide range of conditions 
that once the battle was joined he had no need to issue any further instructions� 
“Once Nelson set the Victory on its final course for the allied line, his physical 
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presence was superfluous� His spirit walked with every admiral and captain who 
paced a British quarterdeck that first ‘Trafalgar Day�’”14
This is the stuff that stirs the spirit of naval officers, but it must be remembered 
that in 1805, and indeed up to the advent of carrier aviation, naval forces fought 
within sight of each other� The development of weaponry that can be launched at 
targets over the horizon is bound to have an effect on this sentiment� It was one 
thing during World War II carrier battles for airborne strike leaders to exercise 
judgment, such as Lieutenant Commander Wade McClusky displayed at the bat-
tle of Midway; it is quite another when missiles—which are relatively scarce and 
cannot be recalled—are launched at targets over the horizon, especially in a battle 
space that could contain significant numbers of merchant and neutral ships�15
Individual units may have their own OTH-T resources—probably some kind 
of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)—to provide not only the location but an iden-
tification of the target, allowing the unit to fire without violating the law of armed 
conflict� However, several problems arise� First, if a coordinated salvo is required 
to penetrate the defenses of the enemy ship or force, unless the unit has many 
offensive missiles aboard or the unit is in company with others and line-of-sight 
communications are available to coordinate firing, a single unit’s missiles could be 
countered by enemy defenses, and thus wasted� Second, a unit’s organic OTH-T 
may not be able to match the full kinetic range of its missiles� A SAG composed 
of three or four ships may be able to conduct OTH-T on its own if network con-
nectivity is lost; but, from the perspective of the joint force maritime component 
commander, if it cannot take advantage of the full range of its missiles, it may be 
wasting them against lower-priority targets�
All this is to say that in modern, dispersed-missile combat, the Nelsonian par-
adigm may not serve� If the loss of network connectivity compromises the abil-
ity to coordinate missile salvos across the entire battle space, the alternatives— 
mission command / mission orders or not—will be forms of melee or sniping, 
unless doctrine requires a withdrawal� Mission orders cannot produce a struc-
tured battle in this case (i�e�, across a widely dispersed force), but they might be 
able to provide for a coherent transition to whatever mode follows�
It is important in the development of doctrine and plans to understand the 
characteristics of the melee and sniping modes� In both, units are operating on 
their own recognizance; but in a melee, the force as a whole is pursuing an advan-
tage aggressively, and the prospects for inflicting decisive damage on the enemy 
may be sufficiently compelling to warrant the risks incurred, which include loss 
of mutual support, increased potential for blue-on-blue casualties, and inefficient 
use of scarce missile resources� A reversion to sniping, on the other hand, reflects 
a desire to reduce risks by adopting opportunistic tactics� Branches and sequels 
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in plans and the structure and content of mission orders must be based on these 
characteristics�
To visualize better the relationships among the modes in a missile-centric, 
network-centric war-at-sea environment, imagine that the battle-force network 
is operating optimally and is generating targeting-quality information on the 
enemy, as well as comprehensive information on blue-force units� If the network 
incorporates processing that allows dispersed units to fire in coordination, the 
network is the basis for structured battle� If, regardless of communications status, 
each firing unit selects and engages its own target set without regard to what oth-
ers are doing, then the result is either a form of melee or sniping, depending on 
the tempo and situation of the battle� The risk in either is that the fleet will use 
its collective missile inventory inefficiently� The same situation could occur if the 
network was disrupted�
Enter mission orders� If the network is not able to provide targeting-quality 
information, each unit has to generate its own� If out of contact with other units, 
the commander has to rely on whatever guidance he or she received in terms of 
what to shoot at and when� The guidance might specify an aggressive approach, 
or it might direct the unit to manage risk in one way or another� Applied across 
the force, such guidance would produce either a melee or sniping� If communi-
cations are intermittent in one way or another, it is still possible for the force as 
a whole, or parts of it, to adopt either the melee or sniping approach� The fleet 
commander must understand this when crafting mission orders�
Effects of Unmanned Vehicles and Artificial Intelligence
A future naval battle more than likely will feature the presence of unmanned 
vehicles and systems that will be characterized by their possession of artificial 
intelligence (i�e�, AI)� Most of these systems will have nonkinetic missions and 
capabilities, such as ISR and perhaps deception� However, some will be fitted 
with weapons and may have the capability to complete all phases of a kill chain, 
regardless of whether policy and rules of engagement (ROEs) permit them to do 
so� The three modes of naval battle apply equally to these systems�
Of course, a species of unmanned sniping has been used for over a century: 
the deployment of naval mines� While the old contact mine may be too elemental 
to fit into the sniping category, influence mines with discriminating sensors and 
ship counters and those consisting of a tethered torpedo designed to detect and 
attack submarines are sufficiently sophisticated to be regarded as sniping systems�
Unmanned systems are not immune to the logic of naval combat� “Swarming,” 
however achieved, is clearly a form of structured battle at the tactical level, the 
same being true if the systems involved execute some detailed, preprogrammed 
plan without communicating with each other� If systems are set loose to find and 
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attack targets independently, a form of melee is the result, depending on how rig-
id their programming is� Conversely, modification of such programming might 
produce a sniping operation� These dynamics hold true regardless of the degree 
of human control exerted in their operation� Understanding the characteristics of 
each mode of battle, along with the conditions in which each is appropriate, will 
inform programming and planning for their use�
Early-Phase Operations
So far, this discussion has assumed that hostilities are under way� However, the 
modes of naval battle also must be considered during Phase I deterrent opera-
tions� If, during a crisis, a U�S� fleet is arrayed in multiple independent groups or 
as single ships, the possibility of a melee occurring must be considered� Under 
the ROEs, USN ships are authorized to act in self-defense� Such action might in-
clude not only use of defensive systems to parry offensive missiles but reciprocal 
offensive actions to neutralize any further hostile actions by vessels that continue 
to present a threat�16 Depending on specific guidance at the time, a particular in-
cident might or might not precipitate a general engagement� If the network cover-
age is complete, centralized decision making likely would govern whether fight-
ing spreads to the whole force� But if, as is conceivable, the aggressor first attacks 
the network, individual group and unit commanders will have to decide what 
to do� The overall commander should decide before the fact whether to allow a 
melee to develop or instead to promulgate guidance that restrains engagement 
until networked control is reestablished� This mirrors the dilemma that Admiral 
Kurita faced—which illustrates that for future commanders an understanding of 
the three modes of naval combat is neither academic nor outdated�
What holds true for the kinetic dimension of naval warfare also can apply to 
nonkinetic operations� A fleet commander who deploys forces for deterrence 
purposes during a crisis (Phase I), especially in littoral waters or other con-
strained seas, needs to accomplish two things: preventing the development of 
tactical conditions that would entice the opponent to initiate a “battle of the first 
salvo”; and not allowing an isolated incident, perhaps the result of a mistake or a 
rogue captain, to escalate into full-scale battle� In Phase 0, tight and centralized 
command is likely to be needed to avoid these situations, but in Phase I and the 
early stages of Phase II, the opponent may initiate an information fight that could 
isolate at least some elements of a dispersed force� While such a move might be 
interpreted as a hostile act in and of itself, it is more likely that the U�S� force 
would not respond kinetically, creating at least a temporary condition in which 
mission-type orders would govern�
Such orders must be informed by an understanding of the different dynamics 
of structured battle versus a melee� The structure of mission-type orders might 
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orient around actions individual units can take to become or remain untargeted� 
If centralized control is present, the overall pattern of such actions might be 
regulated, to support signaling� Without such control, again depending on the 
structure of doctrine and mission-type orders, individual group or unit actions 
could be interpreted by the opponent as a signal that higher leadership does not 
want to send—an instance of a nonkinetic version of the melee generating confu-
sion and risk�17
This suggests that an understanding of the three modes of naval war fighting 
should be considered when developing plans and mission-type orders, including 
commander’s intent, for forces that could be engaged in crisis maneuvering� The 
key is to achieve coherent transition among the modes�
Gaming and Exercises to Explore Tactical Viability
Using iterative war gaming, the Navy can gain a better understanding of the 
dynamics of a future sea fight in the context of the three modes� For instance, is 
it possible to have degrees of structure in a fight, with structure degrading incre-
mentally rather than the force moving abruptly from one mode to the next? Such 
understanding would inform not only MOC doctrine and procedures but also 
fleet design and architecture� To retain at least local structure, should the maxi-
mum dispersion be three-ship SAGs rather than independently operating units?18 
Should all combatants be equipped with both OTH-T and communications-relay 
UAVs? If a general reversion to sniping is anticipated, should the design of sur-
face combatants focus on stealth? Provisions such as these are not cheap, so they 
should be decided with an understanding of how the three modes of sea fighting 
will be employed�
Certain classes of ships are better suited to certain modes of fighting than oth-
ers� Submarines, of course, always have been sniping platforms, owing to their 
stealth and tactical vulnerability if discovered� However, during the early part of 
World War II, aircraft carriers, because of the range of their aircraft, were used 
successfully in this mode, conducting raids on Japanese bases� They could do 
so because the limited ISR of the era allowed them to hide in the open ocean� 
Battleships and cruisers, however, made poor sniping platforms, as the fates of 
Bismarck and Graf Spee illustrate� Destroyers and cruisers became decent melee 
platforms, especially for night battles� This brings us to ships such as the modern 
USN littoral combat ship, which, although designed for missions in scenarios in 
which the ship would be less threatened, now must be adapted for higher-end 
missile fights, perhaps requiring conversion into a frigate� Although such a ship 
no doubt would be armed with point-defense systems, its self-defense capacity 
still would be limited, meaning it would have to operate in conjunction with a 
destroyer or under air cover� It therefore would need to operate in the context of 
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a structured battle—assigning a ship of that type to independent sniping duty 
would incur too much risk� As a rough analogue, back in World War II patrol 
torpedo (i�e�, PT) boats were used in that way—and there is a reason a movie 
about them was titled They Were Expendable�
In the end, it is all about command at sea� The Navy has basked in the luxury of 
access unimpeded by significant opposition for so long that, as an institution, 
it has allowed its war-at-sea posture, and indeed the instincts of its officers, to 
atrophy� It now recognizes the emerging threat and is responding�
Among the features of that response should be reconsideration of the three 
modes of naval combat and how they affect the application of mission command 
in a networked, multidomain environment� The challenge is not simply to extract 
principles and apply them; the Navy first must learn how to talk about naval 
warfare constructively� This will allow useful professional dialogue to occur, aid 
in the development of doctrine and plans, enhance education, and ultimately 
prepare the minds of future commanders so they will be able to achieve mission 
command at sea�
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